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Why Was Russian Direct Rule over
Kyrgyz Nomads Dependent on
Tribal Chieftains “Manap s” ? 
Pourquoi l’administration directe russe sur les nomades kirghiz était‑elle
dépendante des manaps ou chefs tribaux  ?
Tetsu Akiyama
During the subjugation of Ferghana forty‑one
years ago, the Kirgiz [i.e. Kyrgyz], who are now
roused into action, crossed over the mountains to
Ferghana with their renowned leader Lieutenant
Colonel Shabdan Dzhantaev, and assisted [the
Russian officer M.D.] Skobelev in the subjugation
of the population that had settled there.
Letter of the Governor‑General of Turkestan
A.N. Kuropatkin to the War Minister of the Russian
Empire, dated 16 August 19161
1 In historical research of the Russian Empire, which has flourished since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, it has been argued that Russian rule had a pluralist character. While
Russian  authorities  did  attempt  to  propagate  Russian  Orthodox  Christianity  and  the
Russian language, they did, on the whole, pursue co‑existence with local cultures and
religions in a somewhat ambiguous manner.2
2 It was not that there were positive reasons for the Russian Empire to wholeheartedly
adopt  a  pluralist  policy.  More  accurately,  there  were  negative  reasons  for  doing  so,
including the limitations of Russian governing prowess and assimilative power. Central
Asia is a particularly conspicuous example of such a phenomenon. In his disquisition into
Russia’s propagation of Russian Orthodox Christianity and introduction of conscription in
Central Asia, Tomohiko Uyama makes the following assertion: 
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Russian  military  and  civil  officials  were  fundamentally  sceptical  about  the
population  of  Central  Asia.  Therefore,  rather  than  advancing  a  policy  of
Russification unreasonably, they attempted to maintain a passive stability.”3 
3 While the Russian Empire may have intended to Russify local populations in Central Asia,
it failed to make substantive progress towards such a goal. This is evidenced by the fact
that throughout the time of the Russian Empire, the subject population of Central Asia
had the legal status of inorodtsy [aliens]. Indeed, a significant gulf lay between Russian
settlers and locals in terms of religion, culture, and language.
4 Against this backdrop of partial integration, one must consider the people who operated
between the Russian Empire and local communities. The role of the “collaborator” under
imperial rule has already been a subject of attention in historical research on Western
imperial expansion in Asia and Africa.4 Recent development in the history of the Russian
Empire has shed some light on those who played similarly collaborative roles under the
Russian rule. As for the specific people who mediated between the Russian Empire and
Central Asia, it is well known that the Tatars of the Volga‑Ural region played such a role.5
Studies have also identified collaborators among the local populations of Central Asia.
5 These local  collaborators can be broadly divided into two groups.  The first  were the
modern educated class, the so‑called “intellectuals.” The second were the traditional local
elites. Of the two, the former have been researched the most, though there has been a
sudden increase in interest in the traditional local elites. It is an unmistakable fact that
Russian imperial rule would not have been possible, had it not been for the collaboration
of such elites. Research from this standpoint is making forward strides. Research on the
settled areas of Central Asia is making the most progress,6 but there are also interesting
findings  concerning  the  situation  among  nomads,  particularly  the  Kazakhs.7 Still,
research that attempts to construe a more positive analysis of local traditional elites,
such  as  the  nomads  of  Central  Asia  under  the  Russian  imperial  rule,  remains  as
inadequate as ever.
6 In view of this inadequacy, this paper will focus on the chieftains of the Kyrgyz nomads,
who inhabited the highland areas of the Tian Shan Mountains. During the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, the intellectuals among the Kazakhs and the Uzbeks had gradually
asserted themselves as the leaders of their society. By comparison, the appearance of the
Kyrgyz intellectuals came extremely late. Until the early 20th century, chieftains of the
tribes—known as manaps8—continued to have a strong presence as the substantial leaders
of Kyrgyz society.
7 Recent studies have been made on the manaps under Russian rule. For example, Daniel
Prior has analysed an epic poem dedicated to one of the prominent figure among the
manaps Shabdan Jantay uulu (1840–1912).9 In addition, I considered the activities of the
manaps, including Shabdan, from the perspective of both traditional nomadic values and
Islam.10 
8 Although studies on the internal activities of manaps have been conducted in this vein, so
far the policy of the Russian Empire toward the manaps has been superficial. When the
Russian Empire annexed and amalgamated non‑Russian people, it generally used local
elites  including  tribal  chieftains  as  collaborators.  Indeed,  in  the  mid‑19th century,
preceding the military  expansion into the heart  of  Central  Asia,  the  Russian Empire
developed collaborative relationships with the manaps and acknowledged their official
position.11 According  to  the  recent  work  of  Daniel  Prior,  concomitant  to  this
collaboration, the Russian Empire expected to find a class analogous to the Kazakh sultans
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amongst the Kyrgyz;  this had the effect,  consciously or unconsciously,  of  creating or
strengthening an aristocratic layer in Kyrgyz society.12 
9 However, the position of manaps as local collaborators was to change completely after the
establishment of the Governor‑Generalship of Turkestan in 1867. The change came about
because of the establishment of Russian direct rule in the same year, after which manaps
were  no  longer  officially  recognised  as  collaborators.  Nevertheless,  there  is  an
overwhelming body of evidence,  including testimonies from contemporaries asserting
that  manaps continued  to  hold  important  positions  throughout  the  imperial  period,
despite  the  imposition  of  Russian  direct  rule.  While  ethnologist  M.F. Gavrilov,  who
studied Kyrgyz nomads during the 1920s, acknowledged that the shift to direct rule in
1867 had an impact on them, he argued that throughout the imperial period, “the office
of manap (manapstovo) remained rigidly intact, and took on a somewhat monolithic form.”
13
10 Why was it that, even into the 20th century, this traditional chieftain class, though not
officially recognised under Russian rule, did not dissolve and in fact continued to hold a
powerful influence? As we have seen, one reason for this may be found by examining
their activities, including the compilation and publication of genealogies and heroic epics,
as well as Islamic acts. Another reason might be the quality of Russian rule itself at the
time. The fact that manaps continued to exist under Russian rule, albeit without official
recognition, was most likely due to the weak governing ability of the Russian Empire,
including  the  general  dissonance  within  the  Russian ruling  establishment  and inter‑
agency disagreements over the treatment of manaps.
11 From such a point of view, this article will look at the way Russian military authorities
dealt with manaps during the half century of its direct rule following the establishment of
the Governor‑Generalship of  Turkestan in 1867.  Past  studies start  and end by simply
summarizing the system of rule.14 Therefore, this article will focus on the area of Tokmak
uezd (renamed Pishpek uezd in 1888),  and Przheval´sk uezd in the southern part  of
Semirech´e oblast, and discuss how Russian military authorities positioned manaps during
the following three periods: 1) from 1867 to the early 1880s, when political reforms were
facilitated along with the military expansion into Central Asia; 2) from 1880s to 1905,
when Russian direct rule was developed; 3) from 1905 to 1916, when Semirech´e oblast
was positioned as the target of the Russian peasant colonization under the initiative of
the central government. The principal materials used for this article include the official
documents of the Russian military authorities currently stored in the national archives of
Kazakhstan (TsGA RK), Uzbekistan (TsGA RUz), Kyrgyzstan (TsGA KR), and Russia (RGIA,
RGVIA). To supplement these sources, I also refer to official gazettes, newspapers, and
magazines published during the periods in question.
 
Manap s between political reform and military
expansion
12 Following the establishment of the Governor‑Generalship of Turkestan, Central Asia was
put under a system of Russian direct rule. It is well known that the decision to take this
measure had been affected by the spirit of the so‑called “Great Reforms” advanced from
above in the central part of the empire.15 In fact, the Governor‑Generalship was composed
of the same administrative units used for the governance of peasants, namely “oblasts”,
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“uezds”, and “volosts”. In this process, governance of the native population, who were to
be organized into volosts, would be restructured in line with the principle behind the
Great Reforms: the equalization of existing social groups. In other words, in place of local
existing  tribal  chieftains  such  as  manaps,  volost  administrators  (volostnoi  upravitel´)
elected by the “common people (narod)” would act as the new official intermediaries for
Russian direct  rule.16 Volost  administrators were placed under the command of  uezd
commanders (uezdnyi nachal´nik), who were all ethnically Russian. In other words, volost
administrators  were  local  government  officials  responsible  for  colonial  rule  at  a
grassroots level, whose main responsibility was to implement directives from the Russian
military authorities.
 
Map 1 – The Semirech’e oblast in its regional context (19th century)
© Tetsu Akiyama
13 However, the situation in Semirech´e oblast at the time, particularly in the area around
the Tian Shan mountain range inhabited by Kyrgyz nomads, was not so straightforward
as to allow the unitary implementation of the Great Reforms as in the central part of the
empire. Not only had the region itself only just been conquered, it also was adjacent to
the Khanate of Kokand (1709‑1876), one of the Islamic states in Central Asia based in
Ferghana valley. It was therefore a highly significant region in terms of being a site for
further military expansion of the Russian Empire. 
14 For this reason, it was essential for Russian military authorities to maintain the status
quo in the region and establish a defence network in order to tackle the threat of attack
from outside.17 Thus, rather than actively interfering in the lives of Kyrgyz nomads and
removing  manaps,  Russian  military  authorities,  in  particular  the  first  Tokmak  uezd
commander G. Zagriazhskii,  continued their attempts to use manaps as intermediaries.
Indeed, the fact that manaps were elected as volost administrators in all 14 of the Kyrgyz
volosts established in the Tokmak uezd from 1867 to 1868, appears to be due in no small
part to the will of the uezd commander.18 
15 Furthermore,  Zagriazhskii  gave manaps unofficial  posts  outside the framework of  the
official volost system. He gave a particularly important position to Shabdan, a manap of
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the Tïnay branch of the Sarïbagïsh tribe. Until the late 1870s, Shabdan and his retainers (
zhigit) had cooperated with the military expedition of the Russian Empire.19 He had also
acted as a mediator in Russia’s  efforts  to foster communication with Kyrgyz nomads
living around Tokmak uezd. The importance of his position is also evidenced by a petition
sent  in  1876  from  a  Kyrgyz  of  the  Sarïbagïsh  volost  to  the  first  Military  Governor
(Voennyi Gubernator) of Semirech´e oblast G.A. Kolpakovskii, which read: 
If you are the governor of Almatї [i.e. Vernyi: the capital of Semirech´e oblast], then
Shabdan is as if he were the governor of Kyrgyz of Tokmak uezd.20
16 If  we  take  into  account  such  a  situation,  the  following  assessment  (made  by  the
Governor‑Generalship of the Steppes in 1884) is not always exaggerating : “Russian uezd
commander cannot replace manap‑patriarch.  […] He could not rise to the position of
manap‑patriarch.21 
17 However, while the Tokmak uezd commander viewed manaps as important mediators,
there were attempts made within the oblast Government of Semirech´e, particularly by
the Military Governor Kolpakovskii, to faithfully follow the principles of the new regime.
Kolpakovskii had in fact expressed his dissatisfaction that all of the men elected as volost
administrators were manaps, saying, 
The common People have learnt  nothing about  the use of  the rights  they have
received from the new political settlement, and they do not understand the rules of
election.22 
18 In view of this situation, Kolpakovskii had tried to organize briefing meetings for the
common people in various areas of the oblast.  He hoped that persistent explanations
would ultimately allow them to supersede the “tribal principle (rodovoe nachalo)” by a
“highly advanced Russian civilization.”23
19 Kolpakovskii also harboured reservations about the close relationship between Shabdan
and the Tokmak uezd commander Zagriazhskii.  For  example,  when Zagriazhskii  sent
Shabdan on a fact‑finding mission to the mountainous region bordering the Khanate of
Kokand in 1869, Kolpakovskii ordered Zagriazhskii to verify the information, stating the
following: 
My many years of experience have given me an extremely negative view of the level
of  sincerity  possessed  by  Kirgiz  [i.e.  Kazakh  and  Kyrgyz],  and  Shabdan  is  no
exception.24 
20 Another example concerned the “Special congress of people’s judges (Chrezvychainyi s´´ezd
narodnykh sudei)” in the same year, they held to resolve disputes between Kyrgyz subject
to the Khanate of Kokand, and Kyrgyz subject to the Russian Empire. According to the 200
th clause of the “Temporary Statute for the Administration of the oblasts of Semirech´e
and Syr‑Darya”, which was instituted in 1867, it was strictly prohibited for officials to
intervene in the arbitration.25 When it came to light that Shabdan, who acted as the uezd
commander’s  proxy  at  the  congress,  had  forcefully  intervened  in  the  arbitration,
Kolpakovskii claimed that “if such practice is left to take its course without any censure,
it will  take root more deeply and inflict grave damage on the mission of the Russian
authority”. He then accused Shabdan of being “a dangerous individual upon whom the
uezd commander  [i.e.  Zagriazhskii]  is  placing  too  much confidence.”26 He  repeatedly
urged  the  first  governor‑general  of  Turkestan,  K.P. Von  Kaufman,  to  impose  a
punishment.
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21 While Kolpakovskii showed a passive and cautious attitude towards the use of manaps,
Kaufman took a different line. Indeed, Kaufman ordered the matter closed, stating the
following: 
Shabdan’s military achievements, in relation to our expedition in the Khanate of
Kokand, have drawn my particular attention. Shabdan has shown his devotion to
our motherland and sovereign, and I believe it is right to say that he can be trusted
more than any other Kirgiz [i.e. Kyrgyz and Kazakhs] […]. He is exactly the kind of
man we should support.27 
22 Thus, without ever addressing the actual details of the matter itself, Kaufman forcefully
brushed the matter aside and directed the spotlight on Shabdan’s achievements in the
military  expeditions.  These  circumstances  reveal  that  while  the  Russian  Empire  was
simultaneously advancing its direct rule and military expansions, the Russian military
authorities emphasized the latter more than the former. 
23 Clear evidence of the reliance on manaps as mediators can also be seen at the coronation
of the new tsar Alexander III in Moscow in 1883, as it was the manaps who were selected
from  the  Tokmak  uezd  as  candidates  to  attend  the  coronation:  Shabdan  from  the
Sarïbagïsh tribe, Baytik from the Solto tribe, and Chnï from the Sayak tribe.28 Of these
candidates,  Shabdan was sent to the coronation. Prior to his departure to Moscow, a
ticket  (bilet)  of  admission  to  the  coronation  was  sent  to  Shabdan  from  the  Asiatic
department of the Russian Army General Staff. On the other side of the ticket, the words “
Kirgiz Manap” were written clearly (Figure 1).29
 
Figure 1 – The other side of the ticket of admission to the coronation of Alexander III sent to
Shabdan
24 At the same time, we should not forget that at the coronation he was granted the military
title of “Lieutenant Colonel (Voiskovoi Starshina).” While the granting of a military title to
local elites of Central Asia was by no means unprecedented for the Russian Empire, a
government decree dated April 1867 prohibited conferring military titles on Asian “aliens
(inorodtsy)” with low “civic value (grazhdanstvennost´)”, in order not to encourage their
“bellicoseness (voinstvennost´).”30 In fact,  when a Russian adjutant Kh. Nazarov applied
Kolpakovskii  for granting Shabdan a title of  officer in 1880,  Kolpakovskii  refused the
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request according to the 1867 decree.31 Although it still remains unknown why Shabdan
was granted a military title in spite of the decree, it is assumed that it was realized at the
express wish of Russian officers who had participated in the conquest of Central Asia.32 In
any case, the traditional pattern of awarding a military title to a traditional chieftain was
repeated in contradiction to the spirit of direct rule, which aimed to put common people
in charge of the government and raise civil engagement. 
 
Manap s as the aristocrats of Kyrgyz 
25 Under Russian direct rule,  not only did Russian military authorities assign manaps as
mediators,  they  also  began to  recognize  them as  “aristocrats”  unique  to  Kyrgyz.  To
examine this point, it is necessary to go further back in history. Russian military officials
responsible for governing the periphery of the empire based their attitude toward Kyrgyz
on existing attitudes on the social structure of Kazakh nomads. These officials were well
aware that Kazakhs were controlled by the “white bone (aqsüyek)” element, including
khans, descendent through the male line of Genghis Khan and sultans of the same family.
As the Russian Empire accelerated its advance into the Kazakh steppe from the mid‑18th
 century onwards,  Russian military officials  grew increasingly aware of  Kyrgyz as  an
ethnic group that resided in the periphery of the Kazakh steppe. Accordingly, the absence
of the “white bone” or that aristocratic element among the Kyrgyz came to be a defining
characteristic of their social structure. Indeed, a Russian geographer P.P. Semënov, who
had been creating a survey in the Tian Shan mountain range in the mid‑1850s, said that, “
manaps are not considered to be an aristocrat akin to the “white bone”, that is to say, to
sultans of  Kazakhs.” 33 Such  a  perception  was  largely  shared  among  Russian  military
officials until the early 1870s.34
26 However, with the establishment of direct rule from 1867, manaps began to be seen as an
aristocratic element unique to Kyrgyz. One individual that vividly illustrated this change
in attitude was Zagriazhskii. Aside from his actual political duties as uezd commander, he
was  also  a  typical  “military  orientalist  (voennyi  vostokoved)”  involved  in  collecting
ethnographies.35 In his work on the customary law of Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, he states the
following:
Generally speaking, Kirgiz [i.e. Kazakhs and Kyrgyz] can be divided into the people
of the black bone (chërnaia kost´) and the people of the white bone (belaia kost´). […]
Sultans and manaps consider themselves to be of the white bone. Sultans consider
themselves the descendants of khans of Kirgiz [i.e. Kazakhs], who in turn are the
descendants of Genghis Khan, and manaps consider themselves the descendants of
Tagay.36
27 Noteworthy here is how “Tagay”, the legendary ancestor of the Kyrgyz tribes, is directly
linked to manaps. References to Tagay already appear in accounts of the early 1850s, but
in none of these was there even one case where he was directly linked to manaps.37 From
the 1870s onwards, paralleling the quote above, manaps came to be known as “Tagay’s
descendants” and recognized as a group that was based on a hereditary principle. As
such, they came to be positioned as their own “white bone” (i.e. aristocrat) of Kyrgyz, on
par with sultans of Kazakhs. Although the extent to which this new attitude mirrored
Kyrgyz’s own is unclear, based on various remarks this new awareness took root among
Russian military officials  and scholars from the early 1870s.38 As expected,  Shabdan’s
“service record (posluzhnoi spisok)” that was made when he was granted the military
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title of Lieutenant Colonel in 1883, stated under his “family background” that he was a “
manap (title equivalent to sultan or aristocrat).”39
28 Despite not giving them official  recognition, Russian military authorities nevertheless
continued  to  use  manaps as  mediators,  and  increasingly  acknowledged  them  as  the
aristocrats of Kyrgyz. In other words, it would be better to say that the Russian military
authorities did not so much undermine the influence of manaps, as managed to reorganize
and construct them as a ruling class of Kyrgyz. 
 
Manap s as the target of “struggle (bor´ba)”
29 The attitudes of Russian military authorities toward manaps began obviously to change
from the beginning of the 1880s. Having accomplished military expansion across Central
Asia, Russian military authorities intended to penetrate inside the region of the Kyrgyz
nomads. Throughout this process, while Russian military authorities began to indicate a
more positive stance toward the protection of  the “common people (narod),” manaps
came to be seen as an impediment to the colonial rule.
30 In order to understand this attitude, we will begin by considering the special assembly of
the people’s court that was held in Pishpek in 1884. To that assembly, not only people’s
judges (narodnyi sud´ia, bi) but also manaps were invited, to determine the “customs”
that  the  people’s  court  would  rely  on  for  its  judgment.  In  the  session,  a  provision
mandating that “the debts of the poor should be paid by communities and relatives on
their behalf” was proposed.40 However, Pushchin, the Tokmak uezd commander at the
time, did not accept the proposal. There remain many uncertainties as to the details of
this  measure,  but  it  may have been the case  that  Pushchin was  trying to  prevent  a
situation in which manaps used the provision to offload their debts onto the shoulders of
the common people. 
31 In fact, around the same time, Russian military authorities received many petitions from
the common people complaining about being forced to pay the debts of manaps.41 The
response  from  Russian  military  authorities  to  this  situation  demonstrates  how  they
viewed  manaps at  the  time.  For  example,  in  response  to  a  petition  sent  from  the
Sarïbaghïsh volost in 1888, the Military Governor of Semirech´e oblast G.I. Ivanov issued
the following directive to the Tokmak uezd commander:
According to rumours,  Shabdan reimburses his debts with camels owned by the
common people. I am now firmly convinced that Shabdan is exploiting his position
as a manap and is  laying his financial  burdens squarely on the shoulders of the
common  people.  […]  You  must  inform  Shabdan  that  collecting  taxes  or  the
equivalent for the benefit of manaps is completely forbidden by law. You must also
conduct a covert investigation of the activities that Shabdan carries out among the
common people.42 
32 This directive suggests that Russian military authorities viewed manaps as exploiters of
the  common  people  and  were  making  active  efforts  to  safeguard  their  interests  by
keeping manaps in check. From the late 1890s onwards, such an approach became known
as the “struggle (bor´ba)” against manaps, which is the focus of this chapter. 
 
Why Was Russian Direct Rule over Kyrgyz Nomads Dependent on Tribal Chieftains...
Cahiers du monde russe, 56/4 | 2015
8
The situation around the anti‑manap struggle
33 Pishpek uezd commander A. Talyzin serves as an excellent entry point to this topic. In a
report sent to the Military Governor Ivanov in November 1896, Talyzin writes about his
own struggle against manaps as follows:
[...] Slowly but surely, the idea that it is possible to appeal against the tyranny of
manaps is taking root amongst the common people. […] Ever since I took up this
post,  I  have systematically engaged in the struggle against manaps.  I  manage to
explain to the common people that linages of manaps are no different from that of
other  Kirgiz  [i.e.  Kyrgyz].  I  have  also  prepared  cases  concerning  the  petitions
against manaps, but since their grip over the people remains as strong as ever, many
of the petitions end in defeat.43
34 Attached to this report was a reference document titled “List of names of the native
executives and manaps of Pishpek uezd who were indicted for corruption between 1894
and 1896, for collecting taxes from the common people.”44 The document outlined the
course of the investigation and the results of 132 cases, many of which had been aborted
midway, and out of which not one manap had ever been found guilty.
35 This way of educating the common people and creating suits against manaps was not a
successful project in the anti‑manap struggle, mainly because petitions were difficult to
substantiate. As Talyzin points out, the common people were not willing to disclose any
information to him:
[…] Throughout my five years of service, I have attempted to gather evidence to
substantiate  the rumour amongst  the common people  that  manaps collect  taxes
from them. However, I could not find a single person who was prepared to give
witness. The only response I have ever gotten is “We have nothing to petition for.
Everything is fine.”45 
36 Given this situation, while Talyzin was calling for the struggle against manaps, he did not
always break off a relationship with manaps including Shabdan. In reality, it is impossible
to ignore the role played by manaps as arbitrators. Even Talyzin admitted that Shabdan
proved very useful in arbitrating cases of “factional infighting (partiinaia bor´ba)” that was
used to occur in election of volost administrator.46 In fact, in 1892 Talyzin sent Shabdan to
intervene in a case of factional infighting that had broken out in mountainous region in
the south of  Pishpek uezd.47 In addition to this,  among the manaps of  comparatively
younger  generation,  there  were  those  who  were  taken  into  the  Russian  military
government. Indeed, under Talyzin two young manaps served: Mukhamed‑Ali‑Mulatalin
and Diur Sooronbaev. The former worked as a translator (pis´mennyi perevodchik) and in
1895 he was appointed as a collegiate (kollezhskie registratory).48 As for the latter, though
unofficially, Diur Sooronbay served as an important collaborator, especially for a school
building program. Russian‑native schools (Russko‑kirgizskie shkoly), the first of which was
built in Tashkent in the mid‑1880s, came to the Kazakh steppe and Semirech´e at the end
of the 19th century.49 In 1896, there was a plan to build a Russian‑native school in Pishpek
uezd, where Kyrgyz nomads lived. The construction of the school required large sums of
money, but the funds were raised by appointing powerful manaps including Diur to act as
assistants.50 An article in the “Newspaper of the Steppe Region (Dala Walayatïnïng Gazetí)”
printed in September 1897 and titled “News from Pishpek”,  described manaps as  “an
undesirable phenomenon” and denounced them as men who stood in the way of the
school building project.51 The reality, however, was that the school project was driven
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forward thanks to the cooperation of the manaps. Thus, it seems that Talyzin’s anti‑manap
struggle was ultimately “superficial posturing.” 
 
Exile of manap s exposes the weakness of Russian rule
37 The anti‑manap struggle did not take the same form throughout the region. Indeed, in the
mountainous region (zagornaia storona) running from the Kyrgyz Ala‑too mountains to the
frontier region of Qing China, for example, things were different. Although this region
had already been incorporated into Russian rule by the time the Governor‑Generalship of
Turkestan was  established in  1867,  the  Russian population here  remained extremely
small,  even at  the end of  the nineteenth century.  This is  because the region was an
“isolated corner  of  land” effectively  beyond the reach of  Russian surveillance.  In an
attempt to gain control there,  the Russian Empire enhanced its surveillance over the
region in 1895 by setting up the At‑Bash district (uchastok).52
 
Map 2 – Administrative geography of Kyrgyz territory under Russian rule
© Tetsu Akiyama
38 A leading figure who advanced the anti‑manap struggle in this region was the Commander
of  the  At‑Bash  district.  As  can  be  seen  in  the  following  quotation,  he  was  deeply
suspicious not only of manaps, but also of the native colonial organization itself: 
Manaps have become accustomed to the local legal system, which provides Kirgiz
[i.e. Kyrgyz and Kazakhs] autonomy and a people’s court, and they have formed a
tight  organization  (strogaia  organizatsiia).  This  organization  is  an  obstacle  that
stands between the common people and Russia. By manipulating the people’s court
and the local administrative institutions to serve their own interests, manaps are
continuing  to  hold  the  common  people  in,  what  is  in  reality,  the  very  same
condition of slavery that they were in before [Russia’s] conquest.53
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39 In order to defuse such a situation, the commander managed to deploy Russian volost
clerks (volostnoi pisar´) to each volost, and instructed them to keep a close watch on the
activities of the local population.54 Belek Soltonoev noted that such a strategy reaped
some measure of  success:  “Ever since volost  clerks  began spying on the natives,  the
exploitation  of  the  poor  has  decreased  from the  level  it  once  was.”55 However,  this
strategy was not without problems. Owing to poor pay, many of the volost clerks extorted
bribes from the local  population.  In fact,  between 1899 and 1900,  two Russian volost
clerks in the At‑Bash district—the clerk of the Choro volost and the clerk of the Sayak
volost—were  relieved  from  their  posts  for  this  very  reason.56 Furthermore,  as  the
Commander of the At‑Bash district himself noted, some of the volost clerks did not only
perform their duties, but also were in fact serving manaps.57
40 Alongside the strengthening of a system of surveillance, the Commander of the At‑Bash
district sometimes exercised tougher measures, including the exile (vyselenie) of manaps.
The  Commander  thought  that  in  order  to  completely  dismantle  the  “obstacle”  that
manaps created by exploiting the local administrative system, it would be necessary to
physically  remove  them.  Contrary  to  such  a  tough  attitude,  the  central  Tsarist
government  was  lukewarm  towards  the  idea  of  exile.  When  it  was  requested,58 the
Ministry of  Internal  Affairs  refused to give consent,  stating that,  “the matter can be
settled within the framework of local government authority and general law and order.”59
In response, the governor‑general of Turkestan complained about “the lack of forces,
staff, and money necessary for carrying this out,”60 and he succeeded in persuading the
ministry to consent to the exile of two manaps who wielded considerable influence in the
mountainous  region.  One  of  these  manaps was  Choko  Kaidu  ( Isengul  volost)  of  the
Sarïbagïsh tribe.  Choko was exiled twice.  The first time was to the Nizhnii‑Ili  volost,
Vernyi uezd in 1896, and the second to Osh uezd, Ferghana oblast in 1902. The second
manap was Kasïmbek Bakotay (Choro volost)  of the Sayak tribe,  who was exiled to the
Ferghana oblast in 1902.
41 However, the exile policy was not as effective as hoped. In fact,  after being exiled to
Vernyi uezd for extortion and collecting illegal tax, Choko Kaidu, working through the
Isengul volost administrator and others, collected 700 rubles’ worth of taxes from the
local population.61 Furthermore, when he returned to his home in the Isengul volost after
completing his sentence, he wasted no time in rebuilding the “obstacle,” by making his
son the volost administrator and filling the official positions of the volost with members
of his own faction. This allowed Choko to once again collect taxes from the common
people.62 Thus,  while  the exile  of  the manaps appeared to be a  radical  policy,  it  was
actually a measure taken due to the “weakness” of Russian military authority. 
 
Manap s under the development of the resettlement
policy
42 The early years of  the 20th century marked a major turning point  in Russian rule in
Central Asia. One of the key policies during this period was the resettlement policy (
zemleustroistvo). In fact, the Stolypin government introduced the program in order to send
surplus population in the central part of the empire to the peripheries, as immigrants.63
Under this policy, Central Asia and in particular the Semirech´e oblast was to be a major
destination for  Russian peasant  migrants.  To advance this  policy,  it  was  essential  to
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expropriate land from local nomads, which naturally necessitated close negotiations with
them.  How the Russian military authorities  positioned manaps in  the context  of  this
situation  reveals  much  about  their  relationship  with  them,  and  is  the  focus  of  this
chapter.
 
The Resettlement administration as a new supporter of the anti‑
manap struggle
43 In 1905, in order to execute the resettlement policy in Semirech´e oblast,  the branch
office  of  the  Resettlement  administration (Pereselencheskoe  upravlenie)  was  set  up and
placed  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Main  Administration  of  Land  Management  and
Agriculture (Glavnoe upravlenie zemleustroistva i zemledeliia). The main priority of the body
was securing land for Russian settlers by appropriating it from the nomads. However, it
also sought to use the program as a lever for advancing social reform among the nomads
of the area. The first head of the Resettlement administration in Semirech´e, O. Shkapskii,
saw the society of Kyrgyz nomads as one in the process of a class struggle between feudal
lords (manaps) and the common people.64 This idea not only paralleled the relationship
between Russian landlords and peasants, but also took the prevailing idea about manaps
and the common people and adapted it into the context of the Narodonik movement.65
Within this context, officials of the Resettlement administration believed that it would be
possible to emancipate the common people from the “yoke of manaps” by organizing
them into settlement  villages  independent  from manaps.  The belief  was  that  Russian
migrants would be able to settle in the surplus of agricultural areas secured as a result of
the  resettlement  of  the  Kyrgyz  common  people.66 By  encouraging  a  transition  from
nomadic to sedentary life, the Resettlement Administration was waging an anti‑manap
struggle. Administration officials approached Kyrgyz nomads to encourage them to also
make this transition, which they did in part by using the factional infighting over volost
elections: the Resettlement Administration would approach faction leaders who had lost
volost elections and suggest they petition the Russian military authorities for settlement (
perekhod v osedlost´) by dividing up the existing volost. Faction leaders believed that they
could not only take power as an administrator of the newly established sedentary volost,
but also secure land as soon as possible in advance of land expropriation.
44 As for manaps who held sway in the volosts, they responded to the tactic by using the
people’s courts, which were under their influence, to put pressure on those Kyrgyz who
were pro‑settlement. An author called Sh.V. described this situation in an article entitled
“On the Kyrgyz,” which appeared in 1911 in the Tatar journal Shūrā: 
When the  common people  (fuqara)  complain  to  the  [Russian]  authorities  about
manaps, manaps of the volost use a variety of means within their grasp to cheat the
officials. [Manaps] then […] accuse the common people in the people’s court, saying
things like “he is not paying his taxes” or “I have reported this man because he is a
thief”. […] The judges of the people’s court (bis) are comprised of men selected from
the close acquaintances and supporters of manaps. Manaps compel the bis to help
them seize livestock from the Kyrgyz who resisted them. All of these actions are
carried out within the law.67 
45 According  to  a  petition  sent  to  the  governor‑general  of  Turkestan  by  Kyrgyz
representatives advocating settlement in the Sukuluk volost,  Pishpek uezd,  all  of  the
judges of the people’s court in the volost at the time were selected from the followers of
Cholpankul, the manap who controlled the volost. As a matter of fact, Cholpankul had
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brought a number of complaints to the people’s court against these Kyrgyz with the aim
of forcing them to abandon their plans to become sedentary.68
 
Russian military authorities still relying on manap s
46 However, the response to this situation from Russian military authorities, including the
oblast  government of  Semirech´e was generally half‑hearted.  In 1907,  the individuals
concerned held a meeting in Vernyi regarding the resettlement issues. In the meeting,
the Resettlement administration characterised the settlement movement as an attempt to
seek “emancipation from manaps,” and emphasised the historical significance of such a
goal.  In  contrast,  the  oblast  government  described  it  as  a  movement  seeking  the
“emancipation from their  burdens” in the context  of  factional  infighting over volost
elections.69 In fact, despite the order from the Turkestan governor‑general to protect the
pro‑settlement Kyrgyz from oppression via the people’s courts, the oblast government
did not take any specific countermeasures and instead delegated the entire matter to the
lower local military authorities.
47 However,  not  only  were  local  military  authorities  indifferent  to  the  settlement
movement,  they actually aided and abetted manaps.  For example,  Shkapskii  gives the
following  statement  regarding  the  response  of  the  uezd  commander  to  his  task  of
protection:
The pro‑settlement Kirgiz [i.e. Kyrgyz] are concerned that if they prepare a list of
advocates for settlements, the uezd commander will gain knowledge of these names
and pass it to manaps, and then the advocates will be [accused in the people’s court
and] found guilty. [...] In the Kirgiz [i.e. Kyrgyz] view, even the uezd commander is
an informant of manaps.70 
48 Such an attitude was even more pronounced in the police force of the district (Uchastkovyi
pristav),  an  institution  set  up  under  the  uezd’s  jurisdiction  in  1902.71 While  it  was
responsible for surveilling the local population, the police preferred to maintain order by
forging a  cooperative  relationship with manaps rather  than engaging in  the struggle
against them. Given such a cooperative relationship, the police officers were more intent
on suppressing the settlement movement than protecting it.  A settlement movement
leader  in  the  Sukuluk  volost  wrote  of  the  police  officer  in  the  Belovodskii  district,
G. Fovitskii, that he was “a complete enemy of settlement”:
Fovitskii is under the thumb of the manaps who oppose settlement. […] He is in debt
to Cholpankul and other manaps in the district.  He […] has time and time again
demanded that requests for settlement be withdrawn.72
49 Moreover, when it was decided at the assembly of the Sukuluk volost in 1908 to exile the
leading advocates of settlement, the plan was supported not only by the police officer of
the district, but also by the uezd commander.73
50 There was even an example of the reliance on manaps in the Tomak district, evidenced by
the words of D. Uraevskii, who had worked at the district: 
[…] Kutukov, the police officer of the Tokmak district and his predecessor stuck to a
policy of maintaining a good relation with the members of Shabdan’s family. The
reason  for  this  is  that  the  Shabdan  family  considerably  eased  the  burden  of
controlling the district. […] It was not possible for the police officer to solve various
problems that occurred in the district without the support of manaps.”74 
51 Even after Shabdan’s death, Kutukov sought to maintain the influence of his family. In
fact, when the forces opposed to the Shabdan’s family attempted to use the settlement
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policy to divide the volost, the district police officer tried to prevent them from doing so.
According to a petition lodged by Kyrgyz seeking settlement in the volost,  the police
officer visited and pressured them to abandon their plan with the following argument: 
There is no benefit from becoming farmers (krest´iane). The farming life and the
customary law (adat) do not go together. [If you were to become farmers] you will
drink wine, eat pork […]. Therefore, you should not abandon this nomadic life.75
52 Looking particularly at the At‑Bash district (where the anti‑manap struggle had raged)
offers further insight into the relationship between the administration and manaps. In
1911,  the pro‑settlement Kyrgyz in the Sayak volost  complained to an official  of  the
Resettlement administration, Mazurenko, about the “oppression from manaps” including
the levying of taxes.76 The commander of the At‑Bash district, who had been entrusted by
the oblast government to deal with the matter, had the following to say:
The collection of  taxes from the common people by manaps is  a  time honoured
custom, and inasmuch as manaps do not work in official posts, they are beyond the
purview of  the  Russian  courts.  The  struggle  against  this  custom,  which  wreaks
havoc in the lives of the common people, must be waged through administrative
channels, that is to say, through the people’s courts.77
53 Based  on  this  belief,  he  strongly  urged  against  the  involvement  of  Resettlement
administration officials in public administration and revealed that “with the solicitation
of Mazurenko, his secretary wrote the petition.”78 In other words, the commander of the
At‑Bash  district  was  more  concerned  about  the  presence  of  the  officials  of  the
Resettlement administration than he was about the anti‑manap struggle. Thus, during the
campaign to promote the resettlement policy,  instead of  cooperating to advance the
struggle against the manaps, local military authorities not only turned a blind eye to their
activities, but also actually utilised manaps to maintain order. 
54 The importance of manaps as mediators would come to be recognised not only among
Russian  military  authorities  at  the  local  level,  but  also  among  the  upper  echelons.
Evidence for this exists in a matter that concerned the allocation of land to the manap
Shabdan.  In  1903,  Shabdan  had  demanded  that  the  governor‑general  of  Turkestan
allocate him 400 desiatina worth of  land as  befitting a Lieutenant Colonel.  While the
oblast  government  of  Semirech´e  agreed  with  the  request,  the  Resettlement
administration strongly opposed. As a report by a Resettlement administration official
describes: 
Manaps, and in particular, Shabdan of the Sarïbaghïsh tribe, and Cholpankul of the
Solto tribe, both of whom hold the fate of Kyrgyz in their hands, are completely
opposed to the settlement campaign, and they are using every available means to
fight against it.79 
For this reason, the matter was shelved for a few years. 
55 It resurfaced, however, and began to rapidly develop as the resettlement policy became a
more pressing issue. With the tough initiatives launched by the Stolypin government in
1909, the restrictions on Russian settlement into Semirech´e oblast were formally lifted.80
At the same time the regulations governing the appropriation of  land,  including the
provisions  concerning  nomads’  transition  to  sedentary  life  (Instruktsii  o  poriadke
opredeleniia  gosudarstvennogo  zemel´nogo  fonda  v  oblastiakh  Akmolinskoi,  Semipalatinskoi,
Turgaiskoi  i  Ural´skoi  dlia  pereseleniia,  a  ravnykh  gosudarstvennykh  nadovnostei),  were
approved by the Council of Ministers (Sovet Ministrov).81 In this situation, the governor‑
general of Turkestan, A.V. Samsonov, believing that Shabdan would have to be placated in
order to achieve a full‑scale land appropriation, argued strongly in favour of allocating
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land to him. However, Samsonov failed to reach an agreement with the Resettlement
administration, which continued to voice its opposition to the allocation proposal,82 and
the  matter  was  ultimately  entrusted  to  the  Council  of  Ministers.83 This  prompted
Samsonov to make a tour of Semirech´e oblast and arrange an audience with Shabdan.
Following the meeting, Samsonov began corresponding with A. Krivoshein, the director
of the Main Administration of Land Management and Agriculture:
The Kirgiz [i.e. Kyrgyz] are gullible, and tend to be shallow, carefree, and naturally
childlike. Because they lead primitive lives, when they are faced with the conditions
of a cultured way of life, which is yet unknown to them, and the new demands arise
from  it,  they  cannot  avoid  turning  to  “manaps”  in  particular  for  support  and
protection. Manaps are an ancient institution from the past patriarchal way of life,
but among the unenlightened Kirgiz masses who inhabit the Steppe, manaps reign
supreme, and continue to wield a great deal of power. […] For this reason, what the
Kirgiz perceive with regard to all the policies of Russia reflect nothing else but how
manaps interpret  matters.  […]  This  fact  must  be  taken into  consideration  when
tackling the extremely important issue, namely the issue of encouraging the 800
thousand Kirgiz living in Semirech´e to change their way of life.84 
56 Thus,  while  Samsonov considered manaps to  be  an “ancient  institution,”  he  strongly
emphasised  their  role  as  mediators.  He  went  on  to  say  that,  “Shabdan  definitely
understands that the shift to a sedentary life is unavoidable in the future and that it can
bring benefits. He is explaining this to the common people.”85 Samsonov also emphasized
the importance of Shabdan’s role, saying: “Under conditions where there is no police
force whatsoever, Shabdan is an extremely desirable opponent in the struggle against the
agitation activities of Kazan‑Tatar.”86 In other words, it can be said that setting aside the
anti‑manap struggle, he repositioned Shabdan in the context of the struggle against the so
‑called  “Pan‑Islamic”  movement.  Thus,  Samsonov  argued  that  in  order  to  smoothly
advance the resettlement policy,  it  was absolutely essential  that Shabdan—as the key
representative of  manaps—be allocated the land he desired.  Reflecting on Samsonov’s
“persistent  and firm demands”,  the Council  of  Ministers,  in  October 1910,  gave their
approval to a special allocation of land whereby Shabdan would be given the right to use
400 desiatina  for  life.87 Having  thus  carried  through the  resettlement  policy,  Russian
military authorities could by no means ignore the influence of manaps, and Shabdan in
particular.
57 It was outlined in this chapter that, rather than using the resettlement policy as a lever to
intervene in the society of  Kyrgyz nomads and undermine the power of  the manaps,
Russian military authorities continued to rely on them as mediators. In other words, as
the resettlement policy became a pressing issue, the “close” relationship between Russian
military authorities and manaps become distinct. Meanwhile, there remained a large gulf
between Russian military authorities and the common people (narod). As pointed out in
the  article  “On  the  Kyrgyz,”  even  if  the  common  people  petitioned  the  Russian
authorities,  their  statements  would  not  be  believed.88 In  fact,  leading  advocate  of
settlement in the Sarïbagïsh volost  Alike Alimbek made the following complaint in a
letter addressed to the governor‑general of Turkestan:
Manaps led by the sons of the late Shabdan oppose settlement. […] By exploiting the
goodwill  of  the  [Russian  military]  administration  towards  Shabdan,  they  are
hedging us in with an unbreakable net. They bring cases to court in such a way that
we are regarded as tricksters, and that only their words are believed.89 
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Conclusion
58 During the fifty years of Russian direct rule, manaps remained a major influence. As noted
in “On the Kyrgyz”, “the leaders of Kyrgyz are called manap. […] The office of manap (
manaptik) is passed down from generation to generation”.90 This article has examined the
conditions that enabled manaps to thrive under Russian direct rule by investigating the
quality of Russian governance.
59 From the beginning, Russian military authorities consistently intended to view manaps as
an impediment to colonial rule. However, they found themselves unable to undermine
the power of  manaps and so,  conversely,  manaps proved useful  in supplementing the
weakness of Russian military authority. As we have seen in the main discourse of this
article, this weakness derived from the multilayered structure of the Russian Empire. In
this regard, manaps revealed the discord between the centre and periphery of the empire.
In addition to the centre–periphery relationship, there were also various disagreements
throughout the periphery. From such discord stemmed the need for manaps to remain as
unofficial collaborators until the beginning of the 20th century, and thus they continued
to serve as the principle ruling class of Kyrgyz nomads until that time.
60 However,  this  does  not  mean  that  Russian  military  authorities  were  pro‑actively
recruiting, protecting, or nurturing manaps as collaborators. Rather, they were in large
part  “passively  dependent”  on  manaps in  that  they  were  more  or  less  obliged  to
accommodate them.  There were those among the manaps who served in the Russian
military authority, and thus we can see the germination of the new political elite from the
manaps.  However,  these were exceptional cases.  Although Russian military authorities
acknowledged manaps as the aristocrats of Kyrgyz nomads, they were never incorporated
into the official aristocracy (dvorianstvo) of the empire. In 1899, Shabdan had in fact sent a
petition to Tsar Nicholas II in an attempt to be elevated, along with his sons, to the rank
of “hereditary aristocrat (potomstvennoe dvorianskoe dostoinstvo)”, but his request was not
granted.91 It seems  reasonable  to  conclude  that  manaps,  including  Shabdan,  were
integrated to the Russian Empire incompletely. Based on the points outlined above it can
therefore  be  said  that  while  evidence  reveals  the  proximity  of  manaps and  Russian
military authorities, a closer look reveals a deep gulf between the two groups. For Russian
military authorities, manaps remained “close, yet far.”
61 Though the existence of the manaps was convenient for Russian military authorities in
maintaining  passive  stability,  the  manaps could  suddenly  and  easily  change  from
collaborator to resister due to their incomplete integration into the Russian system of
authority.  After  Shabdan’s  death,  Russian  military  authorities  did  not  allow  his
descendants to inherit either his title of Lieutenant Colonel or his specially allotted land92
and  thus  prevented  them  from  becoming  hereditary  elites.  Shabdan’s heirs’
dissatisfaction with this  measure reached a  breaking point  in 1916 and a  large‑scale
revolt  broke  out  in  Russian  Central  Asia  that  same  year.  The  revolt  included  the
participation of the Kyrgyz nomads of southern Semirech´e, among others. The catalyst
for this revolt was a sudden decree ordering compulsory conscription to military service,
a move aimed to address the shortage of Russian soldiers fighting in World War I. This
revolt helped encourage the collapse of the Russian Empire.93 As can be seen from the
quotation  at  the  beginning  of  this  article,  A.N. Kuropatkin,  who  was  appointed  as  a
governor‑general of Turkestan in order to settle the disorder, had to witness the shocking
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and ironical  spectacle:  the sons of a former collaborator,  Shabdan, whom Kuropatkin
himself had supported, now rising against the Russian Empire. 
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ABSTRACTS
Despite the imposition of Russian direct rule in 1867, the tribal chieftains bearing the title of “
manap”  played  a  dominant  role  as  effective  leaders  among  Kyrgyz  nomads  throughout  the
imperial period. This article investigates why manaps were able to maintain this role and how the
Russian military authorities dealt with them during the half century of their direct rule. Manaps
were  useful  in  supplementing  the  weakness  of  Russian  rule,  and,  in  fact,  the  inadequacy of
Russian governance was a key factor enabling manaps to maintain their role as the primary ruling
class  of  Kyrgyz  nomads  until  as  late  as  the  twentieth  century.  However,  Russian  military
authorities  did  not  actively  recruit  manaps as  political  intermediaries,  but  were  obliged  to
accommodate to them. In this sense, they were in large part “passively dependent” on manaps,
but did not actively protect or nurture them as a political elite.
Les manaps jouèrent un rôle majeur en tant que leaders effectifs des nomades kirghiz tout au long
de la période impériale et ce, en dépit de l’imposition de l’administration directe russe en 1867.
Pourquoi  ces chefs  tribaux furent‑ils  capables de conserver ce rôle et  comment les  autorités
militaires russes traitèrent‑elles avec eux durant le demi‑siècle de leur administration directe  ?
Ce sont les objets de cette étude. L’utilité première des manaps fut de pallier les points faibles de
l’administration directe russe. En effet, l’inadéquation de la gouvernance russe fut un élément clé
qui permit à la classe des manaps de se maintenir dans son rôle de principale classe dirigeante des
nomades kirghiz jusqu’au XXe siècle. Cependant, les autorités militaires russes ne cherchèrent pas
à recruter les manaps en qualité d’intermédiaires politiques, elles durent s’en accommoder. En ce
sens, on peut dire qu’elles en furent «  passivement dépendantes », mais elles ne firent rien pour
les protéger ou les entretenir en tant que représentants d’une élite politique.
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